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Abstract
In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantumkey distribution (QKD)
with aminimumnumber of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for
larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this
device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected
space devoid of any unwanted information leakage inwhich the legitimate parties can privately
generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible
assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem inmost of
existingQKD systems.More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase
and intensitymodulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary
manner.We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those
obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Ourwork constitutes a fundamental step forward in
guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.
1. Introduction
It is well-known that two spatially separated users (Alice and Bob) can secretly communicate over a public
channel if they own two identical randomkeys unknown to any third party. They can use their keys to enable
symmetric-key encryption.When the symmetric-key algorithm is the so-called ‘one-time pad’ [1], the security
of the resulting communication is independent of the computational capability of an eavesdropper (Eve) [2].
The only provably secure way known to date to distill secret randomkeys at remote locations is quantumkey
distribution(QKD) [3–6].While the theoretical security ofQKDhas been convincingly proven in recent years
[5], in practice aQKD realisation cannot typically perfectly satisfy the requirements imposed by the theory.
Therefore it is crucial that security proofs are extended to accommodate the imperfections of the realQKD
devices. Any unaccounted imperfection constitutes a so-called ‘side-channel’, which can be exploited by Eve to
compromise the security of the system [7–17].
To close the gap between theory and practice, various approaches have been proposed so far, with twomost
prominent examples being ‘device-independent QKD’ [18–21] and decoy-state ‘measurement-device-
independentQKD’ (mdiQKD) [22]. Device-independentQKDdoes not require a complete knowledge of how
QKDapparatuses operate, being its security based on the violation of a Bell inequality. However, its
experimental complexity is unsuitable for practical applications, as its ultimate formdemands that Alice and
Bob perform a loophole-free Bell test [23–25] in everyQKD session. Also, its secret key rate is very poorwith
current technology [26, 27]. Decoy-statemdiQKD, on the other hand, permits to remove any assumption of
trustfulness from themeasurement device, which is arguably theweakest part ofQKD realisations [7–14]. Under
the only additional requirement that Alice and Bob know their state preparation process [28], mdiQKDwith
decoy-states allows to bringQKD theory closer to practice [29]without frustrating the key rate [22, 30].Most
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importantly, its practical feasibility has been already experimentally demonstrated both in laboratories and in
field trials [31–38], with a key rate comparable to that of standardQKDprotocols [37].
However, it is important to notice that the security of any formofQKD, including the two solutions above,
relies on the assumption that Alice andBob’s devices do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. That
is, their apparatusesmust be inside private spaces that are well-shielded and inaccessible to Eve (see, e.g., [39]).
This assumption is very hard, if not impossible, to guarantee in practice. The behaviour of real devices is affected
by the environmental conditions and can depend on their response to external signals, unawarely triggered by a
legitimate user, ormaliciously injected into theQKD systemby Eve. This could open new side-channels, of
which the so-called Trojan-horse attack (THA) [40–42] is ameaningful example.WhilemdiQKD relievesQKD
from the burden of characterising themeasuring devices, the THAdeals with the important question of
guaranteeing a protected boundary between the transmitting devices, assignedwith the preparation of the initial
quantum states, and the outsideworld.
In a THA, Eve injects bright light pulses into the users’ devices and analyse the back-reflected light, with the
aimof extractingmore information from the signals travelling in the quantum channel. Recently, [42]
considered a feasible THA targeting the phasemodulator (PM) of aQKD transmitter. There, security was proven
under the assumption that this specific THAonly affects the PM in the transmitter and leaves the other devices
untouched. Therefore this result cannot be exported to decoy-state QKDandmdiQKD,where an additional
method tomodulate the intensity of the prepared signals is required. This is very often achieved via an intensity
modulator (IM) inserted in series with the PM.Hence it can happen that partial information about the IM is
leaked to Eve, similarly towhat happens for the PM. This problem is common to any scheme using devices like
PMand IM, such as the decoy-state BB84 protocol [43–51], bit commitment, oblivious transfer, secure
identification [52], blind quantum computing [53] aswell as device-independentQKD.
Here we introduce a general formalism to prove the security ofmost of the optical QKD systems using a PM
and an IM in their transmitters that can leak the setting information in an arbitrarymanner. As a specific
example, we address the optical implementation of the standard decoy-state BB84QKDprotocol with three
intensity settings [43–45] due to its extensive use of devices like PMand IM.However, our results can be
straightforwardly adapted to any number of settings and to all the protocolsmentioned above. Importantly, our
approach is solely based on how the users’ devices operate. For a givenmodel of PMand IM, one could readily
use our technique to calculate the resulting secret key rate of the system. This constitutes a fundamental step
forward to guaranteeing the security of quantum cryptographic schemes using a PM, an IMor other analogous
devices, in presence of information leakage.
To illustrate howour formalism applies to real QKD systems, we investigate a particular formof information
leakage, i.e., a THA that is feasible with current technology. In particular, we consider that Eve injects a probe for
each phase and intensity setting selected by the legitimate user and the back-reflected light is composed of
coherent states of limited intensity.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2we review themain concepts of decoy-stateQKD. In section 3
we present a general formalism to prove its security in the presence of any information leakage fromboth the PM
and the IM. This formalism is then used in section 4 to study various THA that are feasible with current
technology and to evaluate their effect on the systemperformance. Finally, section 5 includes a short discussion
and section 6 concludes the paperwith a summary. The paper also contains appendices with calculations that are
needed to derive the results in themain text.
2.Decoy-stateQKD
In decoy-stateQKD, Alice preparesmixtures of Fock states with different photon number statistics, selected
independently at random for every signal that is sent to Bob. These states can be preparedwith practical light
sources such as attenuated laser diodes, heralded spontaneous parametric downconversion sources and other
practical single-photon sources. They can be formally described as:
p n n . 1
n
n
0
∣ ∣ ( )år = ñág g
=
¥
Here, p
n
g is the photon number statistics, represented by the conditional probability that Alice emits a pulsewith
n photonswhen she chooses the intensity setting γ. The ket n∣ ñdenotes an n-photon Fock state. If Alice uses a
source emitting phase-randomisedweak coherent pulses (WCP), the photon number statistics is the Poisson
distribution, p e n
n
n !g=g g- , with γ being themean photon number.
For each intensity setting γ, there are two quantities which can be directly observed in the experiment: the
gain Q N Nclick=
g g g , where Nclick
g represents the number of events where Bob observes a click in his
measurement device given that Alice prepared the state rg , and N g is the number of signals sent byAlice in the
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state rg , and the quantumbit error rate E N Nerror click=
g g g , where Nerror
g denotes the number of errors observed
by Bob given that Alice prepared the state rg . In the asymptotic limit of large N g both quantities can bewritten
as a function of the yieldYn and the error rate en of the n-photon signals as:
Q p Y
E
Q
p Y e
,
1
, 2
n
n n
n
n n n
0
0
( )
å
å
=
=
g g
g
g
g
=
¥
=
¥
for any value of γ. The unknown parameters in this set of linear equations areYn and en, and they can be
estimated by solving equation (2).
Indeed, whenever Alice uses an infinite number of settings γ, anyfinite set of parametersYn and en can be
estimatedwith arbitrary precision. If Alice andBob are only interested in the value of Y Y,0 1, and e1, as is the case
inQKD, it is possible to obtain a tight estimation of these three parameters with only a few different intensity
settings [54]. A fundamental implicit requirement in the decoy-state analysis is that the variablesYn and en are
independent of the intensity setting γ. That is, the analysis assumes that Eve does not have any information about
Alice’s intensity setting choice at each given time. If Eve performs a THA against Alice’s source, however, this
necessary conditionmight not be longer satisfied and the security analysis of decoy-stateQKDneeds to be
revised. This is done in the next section.
3. Trojan horse attacks against decoy-stateQKD
In this sectionwe present a general formalism to evaluate the security of decoy-state QKDagainst any
information leakage fromboth the IM,which is used to generate decoy-states, and the PMemployed to encode
the bit and the basis information. Belowwe assume that such information leakage is due to an active Evewho
launches a THAagainst the decoy-state transmitter. Note, however, that our analysis could be applied aswell to
any passive information leakage scenario.
In a THAEve injects bright light pulses into Alice’s device andmeasures the back-reflected light. This way
shemight obtain useful information about Alice’s intensity and phase choices for each generated signal. This
situation is illustrated infigure 1. As afirst consequence, the yieldsYn and the error rates enmight nowbecome
dependent on the intensity setting γ, andwewill denote them asYn
g and en
g , respectively. The goal of this section
ismainly to evaluate howmuch can these quantities differ from each other depending on the information leaked
to Eve.
3.1. THA against the IM
Herewe focus on themost widely used choice of intensity settings for the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol,
where Alice randomly selects one of three possible intensities, denoted as ,s vg g , and wg , with probability p p,s v,
and pw, respectively. However, our technique can be straightforwardly adapted to cover any number of decoy
settings.Wewill denote as , ,i s v w{ }g g g gÎ  the intensity setting selected byAlice in the ith instance of the
protocol.
Eve’s goal is to learn the value of ig for all instances i. For this, hermost general THA can be described as
follows. Evefirst prepares a probe system Ep, whichmight be entangledwith an ancilla system E also in Eve’s
hands, and sends this system toAlicewhile she keeps E in a quantummemory. The system Ep may consist of
many different pulses, each of themused to probeAlice’s intensity setting each given time. Afterwards, Eve
Figure 1.The users Alice and Bob run aQKDprotocol with apparatuses that can have leakages (thin arrow in the figure). Any such
leaked signal could be captured by Eve and used to steal private information. Eve can even actively shine high-power electromagnetic
fields on the system (thick arrow in thefigure) to trigger the emission of side-channel signals.
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performs a jointmeasurement on all the pulses emitted byAlice together with the systems E and the back-
reflected light from Ep, which is denoted as Ep¢ .
Let us consider first the ith n-photon pulse emitted byAlice. Later onwewill generalise this case to cover all
her n-photon pulses. For this, let n, ir g denote the joint state of Alice’s ith n-photon pulse and the systems
6 E and
Ep¢ . The state of Ep¢ may depend on all the intensity choicesmade byAlice, so does n, ir g . Now, Eve’s task for the ith
pulse is to behave as different as possible according toAlice’s intensity choice ig given the state n, ir g . Therefore,
we are interested in howwell can Eve distinguish the intensity setting
j
ig from
k
ig and
l
ig , with j k l, , s, v, w{ }Î
and j k l,¹ (note that here kmight be equal to l). This can be solved using the trace distance argument [55],
which says that the trace distance between probability distributions arising from anymeasurement on the states
n,
j
ir g and q q1nkl n nkl n n, , ,ki li kl
i( ) ≔r r s+ -g g g satisfies
dPr Pr 2 , , 3n n n n, , , ,j
i
kl
i
j
i
kl
i∣ ( ∣ ) ( ∣ )∣ ( ) ( )å w r w s r s-
w
g g g g
ÎW
whereΩ is a set of physical events that fulfills dPr 1, , Tr 2( ) ( ) ≔ ∣ ∣w r s r så = -wÎW denotes the trace
distance between ρ and , Pr( ∣ )s w r is the conditional probability to obtain the eventω given the state ρ, and
q p p p p p pnkl k n k n l n
k k l≔ ( )+g g g , with k, lä{s, v, w}, is the conditional probability to have selected the intensity
setting kg (among only kg and lg ) given that the pulse contains n photons
7.
To prove the security of the decoy-state QKD system, we need to determine Bob’s detection rates. This
means that we are interested in the set click, no click{ }W = , where ‘click’ (‘no click’) represents a detection
(no detection) outcome at Bob’s side. That is, Evemust decide which of Alice’s pulses will produce (or not
produce) a ‘click’ at Bob’s side before the quantumpart of the protocol finishes. Here, Pr click n,
j
i( ∣ )r g is the
conditional probability that Bob obtains a ‘click’ given n,
j
ir g . This probabilitymay depend on the detection
pattern observed by Bob in all the previous i 1- pulses. By combining equation (3)with the fact that
Pr click Pr no click 1( ) ( )+ = we find that
d DPr click Pr click , . 4n n n n n j k l
i
, , , , , , ,j
i
kl
i
j
i
kl
i∣ ( ∣ ) ( ∣ )∣ ( ) ≔ ( )r s r s-g g g g
Now, in order to relate the conditional probabilities that appear in equation (4)with the corresponding
actual numbers, wefirst convert these probabilities into joint probabilities and thenwe take the sumover
i N1, 2, ,{ }Î ¼ , beingN the number of trials. In particular, let nPr click, ,
j
i( )g denote the joint probability that
Eve observes the state n,
j
ir g in the instance i andBob obtains a ‘click’. Then, from equation (4)we obtain that
n p p q
n
p p
q
n
p p
p p ND
Pr click, ,
Pr click, ,
1
Pr click, ,
, 5
i
N
j
i
j n
i
N
nkl
k
i
k n
nkl
l
i
l n
j n n j k l
1 1
, , ,
j
k
l
j
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
å åg
g
g
- + -
´
g
g
g
g
= =
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
where D N D1n j k l i
N
n j k l
i
, , , 1 , , ,≔ å = . Importantly, by usingAzuma’s inequality [56] (see appendix A), each termon
the lhs of equation (5) approaches the actual numbers of the corresponding events except for a probability
exponentially small inN. That is, we have that nPr click, ,i
N
j
i
1 ( )gå = approaches the number of events, N nclick, , jg ,
withinN runswhere Alice selects the intensity setting j, she emits an n-photon state, and Bob obtains a ‘click’ in
hismeasurement device. Thismeans that
Y q Y q Y D1 , 6n nkl n nkl n n j k l, , ,
j k l∣ [ ( ) ]∣ ( )- + -g g g
except for a probability exponentially small8 inN, where the yields Yn
j
g
are defined as
Y
N
Np p
7n
n
j n
click, ,
j j
j
≔ ( )
g g
g
and similarly for Yn k
g and Yn l
g . Note that in the special casewhere there is no information leakage about Alice’s
intensity choices, we have that D 0n j k l, , , = and, therefore, Y Y Y Yn n n n
j k l ≔= =
g g g , which is the key assumption in
the standard decoy-statemethod (see section 2).
The analysis for the error rates en
j
g
, with j s, v, w{ }Î , is analogous. In particular, here we consider the set
click error, no click click no error{ ( )}W =    , where ‘click error’ represents a detection outcome at
6
For example, if the emission of an n-photon pulse byAlice is independent of Eve’s systems E and Ep¢ , then P nn, i iˆ (∣ )r r= ñ Äg g , where the
operator P̂ (∣ )fñ is defined as P̂ (∣ ) ≔ ∣ ∣f f fñ ñá and irg represents the state of E and Ep¢ . This is the typical situation that one expects in
practice.
7
Note that when k=l equation (3) implies that dPr Pr 2 ,n n n n, , , ,j
i
k
i
j
i
k
i∣ ( ∣ ) ( ∣ )∣ ( )w r w r r rå -w g g g gÎW for all j, kä{s, v, w}.
8
Note that when k=l equation (6) implies that Y Y Dn n n j k, ,
j k∣ ∣ -g g with D N D1n j k iN n j ki, , 1 , ,≔ å = and D d ,n j ki n n, , , ,ji ki( )r r= g g .
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Bob’s side associatedwith an error, and ‘no click  (click  no error)’ denotes a no detection outcome or a
detection one associatedwith no error. Now, taking into account that Pr click error( ) +
Pr no click click no error 1[ ( )]  = , and using a similar analysis as above, wefind that
Y e q Y e q Y e D1 , 8n n nkl n n nkl n n n j k l, , ,
j j k k l l∣ [ ( ) ]∣ ( )- + -g g g g g g
where the parameter Dn j k l, , , is equal to that given in equation
9
(6), and en
j
g
is defined as
e
N
N
9n
n
n
click error, ,
click, ,
j j
j
≔ ( )
g g
g

and similarly for en k
g and en l
g . Here, N nclick error, , jg represents the number of events, withinN runs, whereAlice
selects the intensity setting j, she emits an n-photon state, and Bob obtains a ‘click’ associated to an error in his
measurement device.
The formalism above is general in the sense that it can be applied to anyTHAagainst Alice’s IM.However, to
be able to evaluate equations (6)–(8) one needs to characterise the states n,
j
ir g that are accessible to Eve, and this
might be difficult in general. These states are required to calculate the coefficients Dn j k l
i
, , , and, thus, the
parameters Dn j k l, , , . In the next subsectionwe show that these parameters can in principle be estimated based
solely on the behaviour of the IM.
3.1.1. Estimation of Dn j k l
i
, , ,
In order to upper bound the value of Dn j k l
i
, , , based only on how the IMoperates, we consider the unitary operator
that describes the action of Alice’s IMwhen she selects a certain intensity setting
j
ig for an instance i.
Importantly, we assume that this operator characterises the behaviour of the IMon all the opticalmodes that it
supports. That is, in general it acts onAlice’s photonic system Ap (i.e., the signal states emitted by her laser), on
some additional ancillary system Aa also inAlice’s hands
10, and on Eve’s probe system Ep. Therefore, wewill
denote it asUA ,A ,E
j
i
p a p
ˆ
g
.
Let A ,A ,E,Ep a p∣Yñ be the joint state that describes Alice’s andEve’s systems before the action of the IM.After
applying the IM, the state A ,A ,E,Ep a p∣Yñ evolves according to the unitary transformation UE A ,A ,E
j
i
p a p
ˆ ˆÄ
g
 .
Importantly, in order for the decoy-statemethod towork, this unitary transformation should produce an output
signal with the system Ap¢ (whichwill be sent to Bob through the quantum channel once the bit and basis
information are also encoded) prepared in a state that is diagonal in the Fock basis. Note here that the physical
system corresponding to Ap¢ might not be the same as the one for the input system Ap. Thismeans, in particular,
that
U p n . 10
n
n nE A ,A ,E A ,A ,E,E A , A ,E,E
j
i
j
i
j
i j
i
p a p p a p p a p
ˆ ˆ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )å fÄ Yñ = ñ ñg g g g¢ Y ¢ ¢
Here, pn
j
ig
denotes the probability of emitting an n-photon pulse in the ith instance of setting jg , and
n n, A ,E,E
j
i
a p
{∣ }f ñ
g
Y ¢ ¢ forms an orthonormal basis, i.e., we have that n n n nA ,E,E , , A ,E,E
j
i
j
i
a p a p
∣f f dá ñ =
g g
¢ ¢ ¢ Y Y ¢ ¢ ¢ .Moreover, the
physical systems for Aa¢ and Ep¢ might be different from those for Aa and Ep, respectively. Also, note that in
equation (10)wehavemade the general assumption that the photonmode of the n-photon state n Aj
i
p
∣ ñg ¢ might be
dependent on the setting
j
ig .
Now,we focus on those joint states n nA , A ,E,Ej
i
j
i
p a p
∣ ∣fñ ñg
g
Y ¢ ¢ that contain n photons onAlice’s photonic system
Ap¢ . Eve’s task is to behave as differently as possible according to the intensity setting.Wefind, therefore, that
Dn j k l
i
, , , can be upper bounded as
D d P n
q P n
q P n
Sup Tr ,
Tr
1 , 11
n j k l
i
n
nkl n
nkl n
, , , A A , A ,E,E
A A , A ,E,E
A , A ,E,E
j
i j
i
k
i
k
i
l
i
l
i
Ap,Aa,E,Ep a p a p
a p a p
p a p
( [ ˆ (∣ ∣ )]
[ ˆ (∣ ∣ )
( ) ˆ (∣ ∣ )]) ( )
∣ f
f
f
ñ ñ
ñ ñ
+ - ñ ñ
g g
g g
g g
Yñ ¢ ¢ Y ¢ ¢
¢ ¢ Y ¢ ¢
¢ Y ¢ ¢
9
If k=l then equation (8) implies that Y e Y e Dn n n n n j k, ,
j j k k∣ ∣ -g g g g .
10
The system Aa can account for the effect of the loss in Alice’s transmitter. That is, we consider that the unitary operator describing her IM
includes aswell, together with its intrinsic loss, the effect of any optical attenuator, isolator and filter used byAlice to reduce the energy of the
back-reflected light that goes to Eve.
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where the operator P̂ (∣ ) ≔ ∣ ∣f f fñ ñá . This confirms that the description of Alice’s IM is enough to guarantee
security.
Of course, the formalism above can readily accept any particular assumption on the THAperformed by Eve.
For instance, in practical situations itmay be over-pessimistic to take the supremumgiven in equation (11) over
all possible states A ,A ,E,Ep a p∣Yñ . Instead, onemight only consider signals of the form
A ,A ,E,E A A E,Ep a p p a p∣ ∣ ∣ ∣f j cYñ = ñ ñ ñ , where ,A Ap a∣ ∣f jñ ñ and E,Ep∣cñ are pure states of the different systems.
Indeed, this seems to be a natural assumption because Alice’s systems Ap and Aa are typically independent from
each other and also independent from those of Eve. In so doing, equation (11)might deliver tighter bounds
for Dn j k l
i
, , , .
In general, however, one cannot assume that Eve’s state E,Ep∣cñ is in a tensor product form. That is, it is not
enough to just consider the system Ep that Eve sends to Alice (together with the back-reflected one) in order to
guarantee security. This is so becausewhen the supremumgiven in equation (11) is taken over all joint states
E,Ep∣cñ it usually results in a larger trace distance than that obtainedwhen one considers product states. To
improve the systemperformance, Alicemight include additional optical elements to force E,Ep∣cñ to be of
product form. For example, she could perform a phase-randomisation on the system Ep (see, e.g., [58, 59]). This
way all the off-diagonal elements of the state E,Ep∣cñ in the Fock basis would vanish, and one could completely
disregard systemE.Moreover,mathematically, to remove all the off-diagonal elements leads to a significant
decrease of the trace distance and, therefore, one expects a significant improvement of the secure key rate, as is
confirmed in section 4.3.
3.2. THA against the PM
In this section, we review and extend the analysis of the THAagainst the PMcarried out in [42]. The central
observation is that the THAallows Eve to partially knowAlice’s choice of the basis. In other terms, the
information leakage is in the formof basis information leaked out to the eavesdropper. Thismight cause the
densitymatrices that describe Alice’s output states to be basis dependent. Below, we provide a formalism to prove
the security of the BB84 protocol in the presence of themost general THAagainst the PM.
Wewill assume that Alice’s choice is random, independent of the IM and of the previous preparation
instances.We define the Z basis by the orthogonal vectors 0 , 1{∣ ∣ }ñ ñ and theX basis by ,{∣ ∣ }+ñ - ñ , where
0 1 2∣ ≔ (∣ ∣ )ñ ñ  ñ .We denote as iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ (
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ ) the joint state that describes Alice’s
system and Eve’s system for the THAgiven that Alice selected the Z (X) basis. Here, the superscript i refers to the
ith signal generated byAlice, and the system Aq refers to a virtual qubit that is stored inAlice’s lab. Examples of
the states iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ and
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ are the following
1
2
0 1 , 12i i iZ A ,A ,A ,E,E A 0 A ,A ,E,E A 1 A ,A ,E,Eq p a p q Z p a p q Z p a p∣ (∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ) ( )Y ñ = ñ Y ñ + ñ Y ñ¢ ¢ ¢
1
2
. 13i i iX A ,A ,A ,E,E A 0 A ,A ,E,E A 1 A ,A ,E,Eq p a p q X p a p q X p a p∣ (∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ) ( )Y ñ = + ñ Y ñ + - ñ Y ñ¢ ¢ ¢
Here, j
i
A ,A ,E,Ep a p∣Y ñ ¢a (with j 0, 1{ }Î and Z, X{ }a Î ) represents the state of systems A , A , Ep a and Ep¢ for
Alice’s bit value j in herα basis.We have, therefore, that Alice’s state preparation process can be equivalently
described as follows. First, she decides which state ( iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ or
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ ) she prepares. Afterwards,
shemeasures the virtual qubit Aq using the Z or theX basis, depending on the choice of the state. As long as the
state preparation is expressed this way, one can consider any possible purification of the states iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ or
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ . For instance, onemay consider
i i i
X A ,A ,A ,E,E
e
2 A 0 A ,A ,E,E A 1 A ,A ,E,Eq p a p
i
q X p a p q X p a p
∣ (∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ )Y ñ = - ñ Y ñ + + ñ Y ñ¢ ¢ ¢
n
with 0, 2[ )n pÎ being a global phase.
Note that we can consider this state because the reduced density operator for systems A , A , Ep a and Ep¢ is the
same as that of equation (13). The optimal solution is the purification thatmaximises the key generation rate.
In a security proof, it is essential to determine the phase error rate, which is the parameter needed in the
privacy amplification step of the protocol. The phase error rate is thefictitious bit error rate that Alice and Bob
would have obtained if Alice hadmeasured the system Aq with the Xbasis and Bob had used theX basis given the
preparation of iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ . Intuitively, if the states
i
Z A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ and
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ are close enough to
each other, then the phase error rate should be close to the X basis error ratewhich is obtained in the actual
experiment. Below, wemake this argumentmore rigorous by using the analysis presented in [61]. For this, we
will assume that the basis choice is done in a coherentmanner, i.e., Alice first prepares the joint system
1
2
0 1 , 14i i iA , A ,A ,A ,E,E A Z A ,A ,A ,E,E A X A ,A ,A ,E,Ec q p a p c q p a p c q p a p∣ (∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ) ( )Y ñ = ñ Y ñ + ñ Y ñ¢ ¢ ¢
where the system Ac is the so-called ‘quantum coin’ [60]. Importantly, the phase error rate is related to the X
basismeasurement on the quantum coin. To derive the formula for the estimation of the phase error rate, we
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consider the followingfictitious protocol. In particular, for the ith trial of the protocol, Alice and Eve prepare
their systems in the state i A ,A ,A ,A ,E,Ec q p a p∣Y ñ ¢ , Alice keeps systems A , Aa q and Ac in her hands, and sends system Ap
to Bob. At the reception side, Bob receives some optical systems after Eve’s intervention, and he performs theX
basismeasurement. In addition, Alice performs theX basismeasurement on the system Aq. Then, Alice
randomly chooses between the Z or the X basis with equal probability tomeasure her quantum coin Ac. Here,
note that, from equation (14), whenAlice chooses the Z basis tomeasure the coin and the result is ‘0’ (‘1’), this is
equivalent to Alice and Eve directly preparing the state iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ (
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣ )Y ñ ¢ . Next, we apply the
Bloch sphere bound [62] for probability distributions to those instances where Bob obtained a click event. In
particular, wefirst apply this bound separately to the events with the X basis error and to thosewith noXbasis
error.We obtain the following two inequalities
1 2Pr X X Error
2 Pr Z 1 X Error 1 Pr Z 1 X Error , 15
i
i i
Ac
Ac Ac
( ∣ )
( ∣ )( ( ∣ )) ( )
- = - -
= - - = -
1 2Pr X No X Error
2 Pr Z 1 No X Error 1 Pr Z 1 No X Error . 16
i
i i
Ac
Ac Ac
( ∣ )
( ∣ )( ( ∣ )) ( )
- =- -
= - - = -
Here, Pr X X Errori Ac( ∣ )= - - is the conditional probability of observing the outcome ‘−’when performing
theXbasismeasurement on the quantum coin given that there is a X basis error; Pr Z 1 X Errori Ac( ∣ )= - is the
conditional probability of observing the outcome ‘1’when performing the Z basismeasurement on the quantum
coin given that there is a X basis error; and the other probabilities are defined similarly. Next, wemultiply both
inequalities by the term Pr clicki( ), which is the probability that Bob obtains a ‘click’ in hismeasurement
apparatus, and after combining equations (15) and (16)we obtain [61]
Pr click 2Pr X 2 Pr X, X Error Pr Z, X Error
2 Pr X, No X Error Pr Z, No X Error , 17
i i i i
i i
Ac( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
- = - - -
+ - -
where Pr Xi Ac( )= - is the probability that themeasurement result on the quantum coin is ‘−’,
Pr X, X Errori( )- is the joint probability of selecting the Z basis tomeasure the quantum coin and obtaining the
result ‘1’ (which implies the preparation of the state iX A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ ), and observing a bit error in Alice’s and
Bob’s X basismeasurement. The probability Pr Z, X Errori( )- is thefictitious joint probability of selecting the
Z basis tomeasure the quantum coin, and obtaining the result ‘0’ (which implies the preparation of the state
i
Z A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ ), and observing a bit error in Alice’s and Bob’s X basismeasurement. Actually, this last
probability is the phase error rate. The probabilities Pr X, No X Errori( )- and Pr Z, No X Errori( )- are
defined in a similar way (see [61] for further details). Note that in order to obtain equation (17) from
equations (15) and (16)wehave used the fact that Pr X ,click Pr Xi iAc Ac( ) ( )= - = - , where
Pr X , clicki Ac( )= - represents the joint probability that themeasurement result on the quantum coin is ‘−’ and
Bob obtains a ‘click’ event with hismeasurement. Importantly, the probability Pr Xi Ac( )= - characterises how
close are the states iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ and
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ . Specifically, by choosing an appropriate global phase for
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ , from equation (14)wehave that
Pr X
1
2
1 . 18i i iA A ,A ,A ,E,E Z X A ,A ,A ,E,Ec q p a p q p a p( ) ( ∣ ∣ ∣) ( )= - = - áY Y ñ¢ ¢
The term i iA ,A ,A ,E,E Z X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p q p a p∣ ∣ ∣áY Y ñ¢ ¢ can be upper-bounded by the fidelity between the Z basis state and
theXbasis state. Thismeans that equation (17) gives us the phase error probability taking into account the
‘closeness’ between the two basis states. To relate the probabilities with the actual number of the corresponding
events, wefirst use the concavity of the square root function andwe take the sumover i N1, 2, ,{ }Î ¼ , withN
being the number of pulses sent in the fictitious protocol. In so doing, we find that
Pr click 2 Pr X
2 Pr X, X Error Pr Z, X Error
2 Pr X, No X Error Pr Z, No X Error . 19
i
N
i
i
N
i
i
N
i
i
N
i
i
N
i
i
N
i
1 1
A
1 1
1 1
c
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )

å å
å å
å å
- = -
- -
+ - -
= =
= =
= =
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
Next, we apply Azuma’s inequality [56] (see appendix A).We obtain, therefore, that except for a probability
exponentially small inN each sumof the probability distributions approaches the actual number of the
corresponding events inN trials. That is
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N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1 2 2
2 , 20
X
click
X,X Error
click
Z,X Error
click
X,No X Error
click
Z,No X Error
click
Ac
( )
-
+
=- - -
- -
whereNg denotes the number of instances associated to the event g. Importantly, here N NZ,X Error click- is related
to the phase error rate, that is, the rate of choosing the Z basis and having the phase error, and N NX,X Error click- is
the observed ratio of choosing the Xbasis and having a bit error. As for NXAc=-, we have that except for a
probability exponentially small inN the following inequality is satisfied
N
N
1
2
2
1 min . 21
i
N i i
i
i i
X
1
A ,A ,A ,E,E Z X A ,A ,A ,E,E
A ,A ,A ,E,E Z X A ,A ,A ,E,E
Ac
q p a p q p a p
q p a p q p a p
∣ ∣ ∣
[ ∣ ∣ ∣] ( )


å
- áY Y ñ
- áY Y ñ
=-
=
¢ ¢
¢ ¢
This is so becausewe can directly calculate the probability Pr Xi Ac( )= - from equation (14). Therefore, if Alice
and Bob know theminimumoverlap between the states iX A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ and
i
Z A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ they can estimate
the value of the phase error rate even if Eve performs themost general THA against the PM. The estimation of
such overlap, however,might be difficult in general as onewould need to knowEve’s ancilla state. To overcome
this problem,we proceed like in the previous section andwe reformulate the formalism above based only on
how the PMoperates.
For this, note that iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ and
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ can be expressed as
U , 22i
i
A ,A ,A ,E,E A ,E A ,A ,E
,
A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p q p a p q p a p
∣ ≔ ˆ ˆ ∣ ( )Y ñ Ä Yñz
z
¢ 
where X, Z{ }z Î , andU
i
A ,A ,E
,
p a p
ˆ z is the ith unitary11 transformation associated to the PM. It supports Alice’s
photonic system Ap and her ancilla Aa, and Eve’s ancilla E together with her probe system Ep.With this unitary
transformation, the overlap between iZ A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ and
i
X A ,A ,A ,E,Eq p a p∣Y ñ ¢ for the ith instance can be lower-
bounded as
U UInf , 23
i i
A ,A ,A ,E,E A ,A ,E
Z,
A ,A ,E
X,
A ,A ,A ,E,EAq,Ap,AaE,Ep q p a p p a p p a p q p a p
∣ ∣ ˆ ˆ ∣ ∣ ( )∣
†
áY YñYñ
which is independent of the state. Note that herewe have used the infimumbecause the unitary operator could
support amode in aHilbert space containing an arbitrary number of photons. Therefore, equation (20) can be
written as
N
N
U U
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1 1 min Inf
2 2 . 24
i
i i
click
A ,A ,A ,E,E A ,A ,E
Z,
A ,A ,E
X,
A ,A ,A ,E,E
X,X Error
click
Z,X Error
click
X,No X Error
click
Z,No X Error
click
Aq,Ap,AaE,Ep q p a p p a p p a p q p a p
( ∣ ∣ ˆ ˆ ∣ ∣)
( )
∣
†

- - áY Yñ
+
Yñ
- - - -
Finally, we use
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
, ,
, , 25
X Error X
X,X Error
X
No X Error X
X,No X Error
X
X Error Z
Z,X Error
Z
No X Error Z
Z,No X Error
Z
≔ ≔
≔ ≔ ( )
∣ ∣
∣ ∣
d d
d d
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
where NZ (NX) is the number of events where Alice’s Z-basismeasurement outcome on the quantum coin is ‘0’
(‘1’). That is, Alice prepares the Z-basis (X-basis) state and Bob detects signals in the Z-basis (X-basis) in the
actual protocol (recall that the virtual protocol concentrates only on the basismatched events). Then, by taking
into account that x x1 1 2( ) - for x0 1  , we obtain the followingmodified inequality
N
N
U U
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1 1 min Inf
1 1
. 26
i
i i
click
A ,A ,A ,E,E A ,A ,E
Z,
A ,A ,E
X,
A ,A ,A ,E,E
X X Error X
click
Z X Error Z
click
X X Error X
click
Z X Error Z
click
Aq,Ap,AaE,Ep q p a p p a p p a p q p a p
( ∣ ∣ ˆ ˆ ∣ ∣)
( ) ( )
( )
∣
†
∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ d d d d
- - áY Yñ
+
- -
Yñ
- - - -
Remember that Nclick represents the number of detected events by Bob in the actual protocol since the quantum
coins have beenmeasured along the Z basis, which corresponds to the case in the actual protocol. Therefore, we
have that the rhs of this equation is consistent with the results presented in [61].
11
Similar to the IM, in general, the PMand other devices,may be correlated in their operations. In this case, this unitary transformation
could depend on all the previous intensity choices that Alice has alreadymade.
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Like in the previous section, note that the formalism above can readily accept any assumption on the THA.
For example, if one considers a specific THAagainst the PMwhere Alice and Bob know the fidelity FX,Z between
the two densitymatrices describing the output states for the X andZbases, we have that
N
N
F
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1 1
1 1
, 27
click
X,Z
X X Error X
click
Z X Error Z
click
X X Error X
click
Z X Error Z
click
( )
( ) ( )
( )
∣ ∣
∣ ∣
 d d
d d
- -
+
- -
- -
- -
which is essentially the result obtained in [42]. Thismeans in particular that with the estimation of the fidelity
given for an explicit THA, as the one considered in the next section, one can readily obtain the phase error rate
and therefore the secure key rate of aQKD system endowedwith a leaky PM.
Until nowwe have discussed the scenariowhere the THA against the IM and the PMacts independently on
these two devices. However, in general, the IM and the PMmight present correlationswhich could be exploited
by Eve in a joint THA.More specifically, the leaked informationmight be dependent on both the intensity
setting and the bit and basis choices. This situation is addressed in appendix B, wherewe discuss how to adapt the
formalism above to also cover this case.
4. Simulation of the key generation rate
In order to apply the theoretical description to a practical case, we treat the THA as a particular formof
information leakage, actively caused by the eavesdropper.We draw a realistic worst-case scenario following the
line of [42], where a THA targeting the PMplaced inAlice’s boxwas studied.Here, we review this argument and
employ it to any other device that is activelymodulated in the transmitting unit, in particular to the IM that is
commonly employed to run a decoy-state protocol.We assume that Eve uses a continuous-wave (CW) high-
power laser to probe aQKD transmitter. The suitability of a CW laser for the THA is due to a twofold reason.
Firstly, it is less destructive than a pulsed laser [63], so it is less easily detectable by Alice and Bob. Secondly, a CW
laser is not less efficient than a pulsed laser in probing devices that aremodulated according to a non-return-to-
zero (NRZ) logic, and assumingNRZmodulation for the transmitter’s devices is a conservative choice [42]. Also,
it is apparent that the THA is enhanced if the power of Eve’s laser is as large as possible, because thismaximises
the amount of back-reflected light for anyfixed reflectivity of the transmitting unit. Thereforewe can think that
Eve’s laser is operatedwell above threshold.
A consequence of these preliminary considerations is that it is not too restrictive in practice to consider a
THAperformedwith aCW laser operatedwell above threshold. In turn, such a laser emits light in a state that is
closely approximated by a single-mode coherent state [64].Wewill therefore assume in this section that Eve uses
high-intensity single-mode coherent states to perform the THA. Formally, wewrite the input coherent state as
ei∣b¢ ñq¢ , where b¢ is a real number representing the amplitude of the input light and q¢ is an arbitrary phase that
can be set equal to zerowithout loss of generality. Notice that even if Eve’s laser is CW, it stillmakes sense to use
the expression ‘light pulse’ for Eve’s light, as a light pulse is temporally defined by Eve tomatch themodulation
period of the transmitter’s devices.When a coherent state of light enters theQKD transmitter, it undergoes
transformations that are linear and cannot change its photon statistics. So the light back-reflected to Evewill still
be in a coherent state, whichwe indicate as:
e . 28i
j
j∣ ( )b ñg qg
In this case, the real numbers
j
bg and jqg are amplitude and phase, respectively, of the light back-reflected to Eve,
which can depend on the intensity setting of the transmitter, jg . Notice though that they are assumed not to
depend on the particular instance i of the preparation.Moreover, inwriting equation (28), we assume that there
is no entanglement betweenAlice’s system Ap and Eve’s probe system Ep¢ . Thereforewe term ‘individual’ this
particular class of THA.
In the next sections, wewill simulate the secure key rate of a typical decoy-stateQKD system against the
individual THA, in three different cases of practical interest, with the aim to provide security guidelines of
immediate use inQKDexperiments. The three cases correspond to different assumptions about the state in
equation (28), whichwill be described in detail in the next sections 4.1–4.3. These cases will be also schematically
summarised infigure 5, at the end of this section.However, figure 5 could even be used as an introductory
scheme to ourmodels instead, as it conveniently displays the assumptions underlying the simulations.
To draw the simulations, themain ingredient is the characterisation of the transmitters’modulators, which,
as discussed in the previous section, leads to upper bound the trace distance between the different settings of the
modulators in the presence of leaked information, as described by equation (11) (see also appendices C andD).
In practice, this often translates into defining themodes transmitted by themodulators and their attenuation
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coefficients. Then, a specific protocol can be considered and its secure key rate estimated. In the simulations, we
will consider the following lower bound to the asymptotic secure key rate of the decoy-state BB84 protocol [3]:
K q p Y p Y h e f E Q h Emax min 1 , 29
0 0L 1 1L 1U
A E
s s s s s s s s{ [ ( )] ( ) ( )} ( ) + - -g g g g g g g g
G G
where AG and EG are the spaces of the parameters controlled byAlice and by Eve, respectively. In the simulation,
wewill use ,A s v{ }g gG = and E j{ }qG = g , and assumewithout loss of generality that s v w g g g and
0, 0, 2 , , 2
s v w v
[ ] [ ]q q p q q p= Î Îg g g g . Here, as for wg and jbg , wewillfix them to particular constant values in
the simulation. In equation (29), the key is distilled only from the signal states; q is the efficiency of the protocol;
p e
0
s s=g g- and p e ;
1 s
s sg=g g- Y0Ls
g
and Y1L
s
g
(e1U
s
g
) are lower (upper) bounds for Y0
s
g
and Y1
s
g
, respectively, (e1
s
g
) is
defined in section 3; f E s( )g is the efficiency of the error correction protocol;
h x x x x xlog 1 log 12 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= - - - - is the binary Shannon entropy function. All the parameters used in
the simulation are listed in table 1 and the associated physicalmodel for the quantum transmission is described
in appendix E. The calculation ofK passes through the estimation of Y Y,0L 1L
s s
g g
and e1U
s
g
, which is performed by
numerical constrained optimisation as explained in appendix C.
4.1. Individual THA—Case 1
Asmentioned in section 3, Eve’s goal in a THA is tomaximise the difference between the states leaked out of the
transmitter. Because these are represented by the coherent state in equation (28), Eve’s task is simpler when the
intensity of the relevant states is larger, as thismakes the statesmore orthogonal. Therefore, the first scenariowe
consider is one inwhichwe over-estimate the intensity of the leaked states so to draw a consistent worst-case
scenario for the individual THA. Suppose that the users characterise their apparatus and find that the intensity of
the leaked signals is always upper bounded by a certain value Imax. This could be the result of an experiment
aimed at characterising theworst-case reflectivity of the transmitter as awhole, without specifically addressing
the individual devices inside the transmitting unit. Because in the estimation of the secure key rate,
equation (29), we assume that the parameters
j
qg are entirely controlled by Eve, it is conservative to set the
intensities of the states leaked out from the transmitter as follows:
I . 302 2 2 2 max
s v w
( )b b b b= = = =g g g
The detailed calculation of the trace distance terms Dn j k l, , , for the leaked states under the settings of equation (30)
is given in appendixD.1. Then, the key rate in equation (29) is numerically simulated and the result is plotted in
figure 2 as a function of the distance between the users. The colours correspond to different values of the
parameter Imax. The black solid line represents the ideal case of no information leakage.When the information
leakage intensity is lower than 10−6 photons/pulse, it is always possible to distill a secure quantumkey, even in
presence of the THA.When I 10max
6= - , the key rate distilled fromour security proof remains positive up to
distances of about 30 km. This can be comparedwith implementationwithout decoy states, where a single
unmodulated intensity is used. In this case, the so-calledGLLP security proof [60] applies, and the corresponding
key rate is depicted infigure 2 as a dashed black line.When Imax is smaller than 10
−12, the key rate in presence of a
THAapproaches closely that of a perfectly shielded systemover short andmedium-range distances, whereas it
deviates from ideal over longer distances. In this latter case, a non-negligible amount of additional privacy
amplification is required to protect the system against the THA. In the same figure, we also include dashed
coloured lines to represent the secure key rate in presence of a THA that targets simultaneously the IM and the
PMenclosed in aQKD transmitter. For that, we conservatively assumed that Eve gets the same amount of
back-reflected light, Imax, from the IMand the PM separately, so tomaximise her information gain about each
modulator. As it is apparent from figure 2, the lines corresponding to this case are almost perfectly overlapping
with the lines corresponding to having only the IM attacked by the THA. This suggests that protecting the IMof
a decoy-stateQKD transmitter against the THA ismore challenging than protecting the PMalone. In fact, an
optical isolation is required for the IM that is orders ofmagnitudes larger than the one for the PM. Even so, this
difference is not larger than about 60 dB [42]. This roughly corresponds to the optical isolation displayed by an
inexpensive commercially available component like a dual-stage optical isolator.Hence this solution is well
within the feasibility range of current technology.
Table 1.Experimental parameters used in the simulation of the secure key rate. The associated
physicalmodel is explained in appendix E. The values reported in the table are commonlymet in
afibre-basedQKD setup, see e.g. [65]. The intensity parameters sg and vg are not displayed in
the table as they are optimised numerically at every distance. The parameter wg is set equal to a
constant value to reduce the parameter space of the simulation. Its effect on the key rate is
marginal.
q ed pd Bh deth α wg f E s( )
g
1 0.01 5 10 6´ - 0.5 0.25 0.2 5 10 4´ - 1.2
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4.2. Individual THA—Case2
In theprevious section,weconsidered aworst-case assumption for the amount of light leakedout of theQKD
transmitter, equation (30). In thatmodel, the leaked intensitywas independent of the inner setting of the
transmitter.On the onehand, this permits to bypass the precise characterisation of theQKDsetup.On the other
hand, it neglects a fewphysical considerations that can considerably improve the key rate. For example, the fraction
of Eve’s light that is back-reflected by a component that precedes themodulators in the transmitter’s architecture
does not contribute to theTHA.A second important consideration is that, according to the initial worst-case
scenario drawn for the individualTHA, themodulators are drivenwith aNRZ logic. This entails thatmost of the
timeduring the encodingprocess themodulators’medium is non-reflective, as its refractive index is homogeneous
and constant between twoconsecutiveNRZmodulation values.Hence, theTHAhas to be executed exploitingnot
the reflectivity of the IM (orPM), but that of the interfaces coming after it in the transmitter’s architecture instead.
Specifically, theTHAwould run as follows12: Eve’s light passes through the IMafirst time; it hits an interface placed
after the IMand is reflected back from it towards the IM; it passes through the IMa second time and isfinally leaked
out of theQKDsystem intoEve’s hands.During this two-way trip through the IM,Eve’s light undergoes the same
changes as the signals preparedby the transmitter for anormalQKDsession.Therefore the leaked light is now
highly informative of the inner settings of the transmitter.
In principle, a two-way round trip through aNRZ-modulated IM entails a double attenuation of Eve’s light.
However, because attenuation plays against Eve in a THA, it is conservative to assume that Eve’s light is
attenuated only once by the IM. Tofix the ideas we can think that it passes unattenuated through the IMon the
forward path and then is attenuated on the backward path in exactly the sameway as the legitimate signals are. In
this new scenario, the settings for the amplitudes of the leaked light are:
I I I, , . 312 max
2 v
s
max
2 w
s
max
s v w
( )b b
g
g
b
g
g
= = =g g g
Hence, differently from the previous case, Alice’smodulation of the intensity directly affects now the
information leaked to the eavesdropper for any fixed value of Imax. The detailed calculation of the trace distance
terms Dn j k l, , , for the leaked states under equation (31) is given in appendixD.2.
Infigure 3, we plot the secure key rate as a function of the distance between the users, varying the parameter
Imax. The key rate has improvedwith respect to that infigure 2. For the largest intensity of the leakage in the
figure, I 10max
6= - , the key rate derived fromour security proof reaches about 60 kmdistance and is always
better than the one attainedwith theGLLP approach.Moreover, for a leakage intensity I 10max
12= - , the key
rate is nearly indistinguishable from the rate of an ideally shielded system (black solid line infigure 3) up to about
100 km, that is 70%of themaximum transmission distance.
As in the previous case, we include in thefigure the simulation of the key rate under a THA simultaneously
run against the IM and the PM (dashed coloured lines infigure 3). Again, the THA against the PMonly
marginally affects the overall key rate. Therefore the countermeasure to information leakage based on readily
Figure 2. Secure key rate versus distance in presence of a THA targeting themodulating devices of aQKD transmitter. Each colour
corresponds to a different value of the intensity of the leaked light, Imax . The depicted key rate is for theworst-case of a single value of
Imax bounding all the intensity settings in the transmitter, see equation (30) in themain text. The solid lines are for a leakage due only to
the IM,while the dashed lines, visible for Imax equal to 10 , 10
6 7- - and 10−8, are for the total leakage coming from IMandPM
simultaneously. For every distance, the key rate isminimised over the angles
j
qg , controlled by Eve, andmaximised over the
amplitudes sg and vg , controlled byAlice. All the parameters used in the simulation are listed in table 1.
12
Weexplicitly consider the IM in this description but the argument also applies to the PM.
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available optical isolators, discussed in the previous section 4.1, still applies here. Indeed, this solution becomes
evenmore effective in the realistic scenario described in the present section, due to the better secure key rate
shown infigure 3 in comparisonwith theworst-case key rate presented infigure 2.
4.3. Individual THA—Case3
In this section, we further improve the key rate under a THAby considering the phase randomisation of Eve’s
signal, as discussed in section 3.1.1. Phase randomisation can drastically reduce the dangerousness of the THA as
it removes any residual entanglement with the eavesdropper’s probes, andwe can expect higher keywith the
phase randomisation due to the non-existence of the off-diagonal elements. However, on the other hand, one
has to be very careful about howphase randomisation is implemented, as this could open new loopholes. For
example, if it is realised by adding a supplementarymodulator to the system, Eve could first direct the THA
against this new device to learn the phase information, and then address the PMand the IMas in the non-phase-
randomised case, thus suppressing all the benefits due to the randomisation of the phase.
However, we showed in the previous sections that the THA against the PM is less effective than the one
against the IM. Therefore, in order to improve the performance of the system against the THA, it ismore
important to randomise the phase of Eve’s light directed against the IM than the one against the PM. This offers
an alternative, possiblymore robust, way to implement phase randomisation. Specifically, we can avoid using an
additional ad-hocmodule and focus rather on theworkingmechanismof the IM,which is part already of the
transmitting unit. A common technique tomodulate intensity is via a symmetricMach–Zehnder interferometer
(MZI). The light entering theMZI isfirst split into two beams and then recombinedwith a suitable phase. This
will generate interference and therefore intensitymodulation at the output ports of theMZI. By blocking one of
the output ports, intensitymodulation is obtained from the unblocked port as a result of the destructive or
constructive interfering process. Tomodulate the relative phase between the two arms of theMZI, it is sufficient
to control the refractive index of only one of the twoMZI arms, and this is themost commonly used
configuration.However, if a ‘dual-drive’ IM is used instead, both the arms in theMZI can be independently
controlled, so to gain simultaneous control over the relative phase as well as the global phase of the signals
traversing the IM respect to an external reference phase. If the global phase in the dual-drive IM is randomised,
by encoding in each time slot a different phase value, Eve’s probing signal will be phase randomised too and its
phasewill become uninformative to Eve. In this case, the state of the leaked signals seen by Evewill not be the one
in equation (28) anymore andwill be replaced by the following one:
n
n ne . 32
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n
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j
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We simulate the secure key rate for this situation using the detailed calculation of the trace distance terms Dn j k l, , ,
given in appendixD.3 and setting the intensities 2
j
bg as in equation (31). That is, we still consider a THAwhere
Eve’s light crosses the IMfirst and is back-reflected to Eve from an interface placed after the IM in the transmitter
architecture.
Figure 3. Secure key rate versus distance in presence of a THA targeting themodulating devices of aQKD transmitter. Each colour
corresponds to a different value of Imax. The depicted key rate is obtainedwhen the intensity of the leaked light ismodulated in the
sameway as for the standard light pulses in decoy-stateQKD, see equation (31) in themain text. The solid lines are for a leakage due
only to the IM,while the dashed lines, visible for Imax equal to 10 , 10
6 7- - and 10−8, correspond to the total leakage coming from the
IM and the PMof the transmitter simultaneously. For every distance, the key rate isminimised over the angles
j
qg , controlled by Eve,
andmaximised over the amplitudes sg and vg , controlled byAlice. All the parameters used in the simulation are listed in table 1.
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The result of the simulation is reported in figure 4. It is apparent that the key rate has vastly improvedwith
respect tofigures 2 and 3. Even for a leakage intensity as large as I 10max
2= - , the key rate remains positive up to
about 40 km. For an intensity smaller than I 10max
6= - , the resulting key rate is indistinguishable from the ideal
one (solid black line) over almost thewhole distance range. This shows the beneficial effect of phase
randomisation, whichwas expected from the discussion in section 3.1.1. Differently fromprevious cases, the
simultaneous information leakage from IMandPM (dashed lines in thefigure) leads now to a key rate that is
apparently lower than for a leakage due to the IMonly (solid lines in the figure). For example, when I 10max
3= -
and the leakage is due to the IMonly, the key rate remains positive formore than 85 km,while it falls below
50 km for a simultaneous leakage fromPMand IM.
Given the benefit of phase randomisation, a natural question arises if sending only an n-photon Fock state,
rather than its classicalmixture, is beneficial to Eve. In appendix F, we discuss this point, andwe show that the
benefit of employing this attack Eve obtains is negligibly small, i.e., this attack can enlarge the trace distance only
by the order of the transmission rate of Alice’s device, which is negligible given the proper installation of optical
isolators andfilters. By recalling that phase randomisation transforms any state into a classicalmixture of Fock
states, we can conclude that the results presented in this section are essentially the secure key rate with themost
general THA against IM assuming the phase randomisation.
From a practical perspective, phase randomisationmakes the IM as robust against information leakage as a
non-phase-randomised PM. This, in combinationwith the enhanced security due to the removal of any residual
entanglement with Eve aswell as that of all the off-diagonal elements, promotes phase randomisation as a
relevant countermeasure to prevent the THAand the information leakage in general from the transmitter of
decoy-stateQKDandmdiQKD.
Before concluding this section, it is useful to summarise the physicalmodels and the assumptions underlying
our simulations. This is donewith the help offigure 5.
In section 4.1, we considered the scenario depicted infigure 5(a), leading to equation (30). In this case, the
coherent state of light back-reflected by the IM carries in its phase
j
qg the information about the intensity settings
of the IM, jg . Its amplitude is themaximumallowed by any physicalmechanismused to limit Eve’s input light,
irrespective of the IM settings, thusmaking the states outputted byAlicemore distinguishable to Eve. This,
togetherwith the choice of the angles
j
qg , chosen to bemost favourable to Eve, let us draw theworst-case key rate
lines shown infigure 2.
In section 4.2, we devised amore realistic scenario, depicted infigure 5(b). Typically, Eve’s light is reflected
by an interface placed after the IM (double line in thefigure) rather than by the IM itself. During the THA, Eve’s
light can pass through the IMwhen it is fully transmissive, to be reflected by the interface and pass through the
IMagainwhen the intensity settings are on. This way, Eve’s light ismodulatedwith exactly the same settings jg
used byAlice for her own states, leading to equation (31) and figure 3.
Finally, in section 4.3, we applied phase randomisation to any light emerging fromAlice’smodule, as shown
infigure 5(c). For the intensity of the light back-reflected to Eve, we considered the same scenario as in
figure 5(b). The ideal phase randomiser shown in the figure is a powerful resource as it removes any phase
information from the output states, see equation (32), leading to better key rates, as reported infigure 4.
Figure 4. Secure key rate versus distance in presence of a THA targeting themodulating devices of aQKD transmitter. Each colour
corresponds to a different value of the leaked intensity Imax. The phase of the leaked light is randomised, see equation (32) in themain
text. The solid lines are for a leakage due only to the IMwhile the dashed lines, corresponding to amuch lower rate, are for the total
leakage due to IM and PMsimultaneously. For every distance, the key rate ismaximised over the amplitudes sg and vg . All the
parameters used in the simulation are listed in table 1.
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Themodel used to draw the lines for the PM is not explicitly described, as it is similar to the IMone and is
detailed in [42]. Although the cases described in this section do not constitute an exhaustive list, they represent
useful practical cases and can be used as guidelines for the secure implementation of real QKD systems.
5.Discussion
In this work, we have presented a general formalism to calculate the secret key rate of decoy-state QKDand
mdiQKDunder anyTHAdirected against the transmitter’smodulators. It is useful to give some insight into this
formalism, in particular the one for IM, and discuss why the THAaffects the standard theory of decoy states.
In the analysis of the decoy-statemethodwithout the THA, afictitious protocol is consideredwhere Alice
delays her decision on the intensity settings after Bob detects a pulse. That is, after the detection of the pulse,
Alice randomly decides the intensity setting ,s vg g and wg [30]. For simplicity, let us consider the discrimination
between the signal state s and thefirst decoy state v only. By using the relation
n nPr click, Pr click, 1i i
s v
( ∣ ) ( ∣ )g g+ = and the Bayes’s rule, we can rewrite equation (4) as:
n
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,s,v ,s,v≔ . From this equation, we see that in the case of noTHA, D 0n,s,v = and
nPr click,i
Pr
Pr Pr v
v
s v
( ∣ )
( )
( ) ( )
g=g
g g+
for any i and n. This entails that Alice’s assignment of the intensities in the
fictitious protocol can bemade identical and independent of the instance i over the detected instances. This
allows us to use probability inequalities, such as themultiplicative chernoff bound [30], which applies to
independent trials. However, when the THA is on the line, D 0n,s,v ¹ and the bound to the lhs of equation (33)
becomes dependent on the instance i. To solve this problem,wemake use of Azuma’s inequality [56]. Because
we are in the asymptotic scenario, the technical details related to the inequality are unnecessary andwewill not
write themhere explicitly.
Our formalismdoes not require any knowledge of Eve’smeasurement for the THAor the detailed
specification of the state used. Instead, a detailed characterisation of themodulators is needed. This is important
becausewhile the full characterisation of Alice’smodulators overmanymodes is doable at least in principle, the
characterisation of Eve’s THA is impossible even in principle. However, the full characterisation of Alice’s
modulatorsmight be challenging in practice and further research needs to be done in this direction.We remark
that our formalism is a powerful tool in this context because it can readily accept anymathematicalmodel that
describes the behaviour of themodulators.
Aswehave discussed in section 3.1.1 andpractically demonstrated in section 4.3, it is important to perform
phase randomisationof Eve’s signals to defeat theTHAexploiting entanglement and to enhance the key rate.
Figure 5.Models and states used in the simulation of individual THA targeting the IM. (a)The intensity of the back-reflected light is
independent of the intensity settings (Case 1, section 4.1). (b)The intensity of the back-reflected light depends on the intensity settings
(Case 2, section 4.2). (c)Eve’s back-reflected light is phase randomised and it is represented by the classicalmixture of Fock states
(Case 3, section 4.3).
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However, on the other hand, it is important to perform the randomisationwithout opening additional loopholes.
Also, the question remains ofwhether this solution ismore practical than theone basedona series of optical
isolators. Active phase randomisation requires precise synchronisation and a sequence of randomnumbers in the
input. Even if correctly performed, a certain level of optical isolation is always needed to shield a system from the
external environment. The total amount of required isolation clearlydepends onphase randomisation, as seen by
comparingfigures 3 and4.However, thesefigures also show that the difference in the values of Imax amounts
roughly to 60 dB,which canbe achievedwith a single entirely passive component like a dual-stage optical isolator.
Hence evenhigh isolation levels can be inexpensively achieved through a series of such isolators.
6. Conclusion
In this paper,wehavequantified the secure key rate of decoy-state-basedQKD inpresence of leaky transmitters. This
allowedus to suggest quantitative countermeasures to restore security even in thismore general scenario.A real setup
is typically leaky inpractice, due to thepresence of side channels hidden in thepreparationof the communication
signals, or due to the active interventionof an eavesdropper. The analysis of this case is thenof immediatepractical
interest.Our analysis applies to anydecoy-state system that uses an IMor aPMtodistill a quantumkey. It includes in
fact themost general attackbasedon the extra informationpossibly leaked fromsuchdevices.
We have employed our formalism to analyse particular examples of THA,where Eve exploits coherent states
of light to probe the intensity and PM in the transmitter. Our results show that it is possible to distill a key from
leaky transmitters that approach the ideal rate of a perfectly shielded system. For that, twomain solutions play a
crucial role. On one hand, optical isolation has to be guaranteed for any system through an adequate number of
attenuators and optical isolators. On the other hand, active phase randomisation can further enhance the
protection, removing any residual entanglement fromEve’s probing signals.
Given the generality of our approach and its applicability to cases of practical interest, we believe that it will
become a fundamental tool to analyse the security of real-world quantum communication systems, including
those for standardQKD,mdiQKD and the device-independent QKDwhere PMand/or IMare used.
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AppendixA. Azuma’s inequality
In this appendixwe introduce Azuma’s inequality [56]. It can be applied to a sequence of random variables
X X X, , , l0 1( ) ( ) ( )¼ that satisfies themartingale and the bounded difference conditions (BDC). In particular, a set
of randomvariables is called amartingale if and only if E X X X X X, , ,l l l1 0 1[ ∣ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )¼ =+ holds for any l, where
E [·] represents the expectation value. That is, the expectation value of the l 1 th( )+ random variable
conditional on all the previous random variables is equal to the lth random variable. On the other hand,
X X X, , , l0 1( ) ( ) ( )¼ satisfies the BDC if and only if there exists c 0l( ) > such that X X cl l l1∣ ∣( ) ( ) ( )-+ for any l. In
this scenario, Azuma’s inequality states that
X X lPr 2e A.1l 0
l
k
l
c l
2 2
2 1
2[∣ ∣ ] ( )( ) ( ) ( ( ) )d- > - å
d
=
for any 0, 1( )d Î .
Now, to derive the result that we use in themain text, we proceed as follows. In particular, let us consider that
weflip coins starting from thefirst coin in order. The coins can be correlated in an arbitrarymanner. Let yu be the
randomvariable that represents the result of the uth coin, with y 1u = when the result is head and y 0u = when
it is tail. Let P y 1 , ,u u0 1( ∣ )x x= ¼ - be the conditional probability of having head in the uth coin conditional on all
the results of the previous coins, whichwe denote as , , u0 1x x¼ - . Finally, we denote by
l( )L the actual number of
heads obtained afterflipping l coins. Then, it can be shown that
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X P y 1 , , A.2l l
u
l
u u
1
0 1≔ ( ∣ ) ( )
( ) ( ) å x xL - = ¼
=
-
is amartingale and satisfies the BDCWehave, therefore, that
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Appendix B. Joint THAwhen the IMand the PMare correlated
In this appendix, we explain briefly how to adapt our formalism to evaluate the situationwhere there are
arbitrary correlations between the IM and the PM, and Eve can exploit this fact in her THA.
In this correlated scenario, Alice andBob could first estimate the bit and basis dependent single-photon
yield, whichwe denote as Y1
, ,s A Ag x z , for the signal setting. Here, the parameter Ax denotes Alice’s bit value and Az is
her basis choice. That is, Y1
, ,s A Ag x z represents the conditional probability that Bob obtains a ‘click’ event given that
Alice selects the signal setting and sends him a single-photon state encoding a bit value Ax in the basis Az . To
estimate this yield, Alice can declare Bob (over the authenticated public channel) all the bit and basis information
associated to those instances where she used a decoy setting andBob obtained a ‘click’ event.With this
information, Alice and Bob can estimate Y1
, ,s A Ag x z by using amodified version of equation (6) given by
Y q Y q Y D1 . B.1n nkl n nkl n n j k l
, , , , , ,
, , ,
,j k lA A A A A A A A∣ [ ( ) ]∣ ( )- + -g x z g x z g x z x z
Here, the parameter Dn j k l, , ,
,A Ax z is amodified version of Dn j k l, , , that refers solely to the set of choices ,A A{ }x z . Note
that thismodification is needed because now the decoy-statemethod is bit-and-basis-dependent.With a
procedure similar to the one adopted to go from equation (6) to equation (8), one can obtain the single-photon
bit error rate for the signal setting, which also depends onBob’s basis choice and on his bit value.
After obtaining the single-photon yield aswell as the associated error rate, Alice and Bob generate a secret key
from those instances where Alice emitted a single-photon pulse prepared in the Z basis and using the signal
setting, and Bob obtained a ‘click’ event when hemeasured the pulse in the Z basis. Note that all the statistics
associated to such instances are estimated through the bit-and-basis-dependent decoy-statemethod. Likewise,
one can readily obtain the single-photon yield associated to those events where Alice emits a single-photon pulse
prepared in the Xbasis and using the signal setting, and Bob obtains a ‘click’ eventwhen he uses the X basis.
Now, to generate a key, one follows the technique explained in section 3.2 except for a smallmodification.One
has to replaceU
i
A ,A ,E
,
p a p
ˆ z in equation (22)withU
i
A ,A ,E
, , ,1
p a p
sˆ z g , which is a restricted version ofU
i
A ,A ,E
,
p a p
ˆ z that only considers
the single-photon emission part in the signal setting. That is, Alice and Bob have to characterise the behaviour of
the PMdepending on their bases choice when they select the signal setting.
With themodifications above, one can obtain the phase error rate X Error Zd - from equation (26) because the
bit-and-basis-dependent decoy-statemethod allows us to evaluate all the parameters needed to solve this
equation, all of which are now restricted only to the single-photon emission events. Then, in the asymptotic limit
of a large number of transmitted signals, we have that the secure key rate is given by
K q p Y p Y h
f E Q h E
1
, B.2
i
i i i i
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X Error Z
s s s s
s s s
{ [ ( )]
( ) ( )} ( )
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g g g g
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where p i
0
, ,Zsg is the probability that Alice emits the vacuum state given that she chooses sg and the bit value i in the
Z basis. The other parameters which appear in equation (B.2) are defined in a similarmanner (see also
equation (29)). Therefore, we conclude that one can apply our formalism to analyse also the casewhere there are
arbitrary correlations between the IM and the PM, and prove security in themost general case, given that a full
description of the behaviour of these two devices is available.
AppendixC. Estimation ofY Y,0L 1L
s s
g g
and e1U
s
g
In this appendixwe show that these parameters can be estimated using linear programming. Such instances of
optimisation problems can be solved efficiently in polynomial time [66]. Although the estimationmethod
presented here is valid for any number of decoy states used byAlice, wewill assume, like in themain text, that
Alice employs three different intensity settings: ,s vg g and wg .
Our starting point is equation (6). Let us consider first the case k=l. As shown in appendixD, the
parameters Dn j k, , do not depend on the photon number n, at least for the examples considered in section 4. This
means, in particular, that this equation can be rewritten as
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or, equivalently, the yields Yn
j
g
and Yn k
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Y Y , C.2n n
jkj k ( )= + D
g g
with D D,jk j k j k, ,[ ]D Î - . Since Alice uses three different intensity settings, we have the following six conditions
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By combining the first and the third one, wefind, for example, that sv vsD = -D . Similarly, we obtain
sw wsD = -D and vs ws vw wvD - D = D = -D . By using this last conditionwefind, therefore, that
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That is, we can express the yields Yn v
g and Yn w
g as a function of Yn s
g and the parameters wsD and vwD .
Next, we consider the case k l¹ . In this scenario, equation (6) can be rewritten as
Y q Y q Y1 , C.5n nkl n nkl n
njklj k l( ) ( )= + - + D
g g g
for all n, where D D,njkl n j k l n j k l, , , , , ,[ ]D Î - .We have, therefore, the following three conditions:
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If we substitute in these equations the value of Yn v
g and Yn w
g given by equation (C.4)we obtain the following three
equality constraints:
q
q
q q
0 ,
0 ,
0 1 . C.7
n
n
n
n
n n
n
ws
vw
vw svw
sw
ws vw vsw
sv
ws
sv
vw wsv( ) ( )
=D + D + D
= D + D - D
= D - - D - D
Finally, by taking into account that D D,njkl n j k l n j k l, , , , , ,[ ]D Î - for all n and for all j k l, , s, v, w{ }Î with
j k l¹ ¹ , we have that to satisfy equation (C.7)wemust fulfill the following conditions:
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C.1. Estimation of Y0L
s
g
Herewe present a linear program to estimate the parameter Y0L
s
g
.Wewill assume that all the quantities below
refer to events where bothAlice and Bob use the same basis (e.g., the Z basis), whichwill be considered as the key
generation basis.We start by calculating the gain associated to the different intensity settings selected byAlice in
this scenario. If we combine equations (2) and (C.4)wehave that
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That is, all the gains can bewritten as a function of the yields Yn s
g togetherwith the additional terms wsD and vwD .
Equation (C.9) contains an infinite number of unknown parameters Yn s
g . Next, we reduce it to afinite set. For
this, we derive a lower and upper bound for the gains Qg that only depend on afinite number, S 1cut + , of yields
Yn s
g . In particular, since Y0 1n s g and p 0n s g for all n, we have that
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procedure, one can obtain as well a lower and upper bound for Q vg and Q wg .
Based on the foregoing, we find that Y0L
s
g
can be calculated using the following linear program:
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g
=
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=
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Note that the value of the parameters Dj k, and Dn j k l, , , , with j k l, , s, v, w{ }Î , is provided in appendixD. Also,
the value of the observables Q jg for a typical channelmodel can be found in appendix E. The linear program
above has S 3cut + unknown parameters: Y ,n wss D
g and vwD . Its solution is directly Y0Ls
g
.
C.2. Estimation of Y1L
s
g
To calculate Y1L
s
g
, we can reuse the linear program given by equation (C.11), only substituting its linear objective
functionwith Y1
s
g
.
C.3. Estimation of e1U
s
g
To obtain e1U
s
g
, we can again reuse the linear program given by equation (C.11), onlymaking the following three
changes. First, all the parameters now refer to the X basis rather than the Z basis. For example, Q jg nowdenotes
the gainwhenAlice selects the intensity setting jg and bothAlice and Bob use theX basis, and similarly for the
other quantities that appear in equation (C.11). Second, we substitute the parameters Q jg with Q Ej jg g for all
j s, v, w{ }Î , andwe replace the yields Yn s
g with other variables that wewill denote as nsw
g . These variables
represent the value of Y en ns s
g g . Third, we substitute the linear objective functionwith 1
sw- g , where theminus sign
is because equation (C.11) is aminimisation problem andwe are interested in obtaining an upper bound for 1
swg .
If we denote the solution to this optimisation problem as nsol, then e1U
s
g
is simply given by
e
n
Y
, C.121U
sol
1L
s
s
( )= -g g
where, again,Y1L
s
g
nowdenotes a lower boundon the yield of the single-photonpulseswhenbothAlice andBob
employ theXbasis. The value of the observables Q jg and E jg for a typical channelmodel is provided in appendix E.
AppendixD. Estimation of Dn j k, , and Dn j k l, , ,
In this appendixwe calculate the parameters Dn j k, , and Dn j k l, , , for the three examples studied in section 4. These
parameters are needed to estimate a lower bound on the yields Y0
s
g
and Y1
s
g
, together with an upper bound on the
phase error rate e1
s
g
, which is done in appendix C.
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All these examples correspond to individualTHA,which implies that the states n,
j
ir g , which are accessible toEve,
donot dependon the instance i. In addition, they assume, as expected inmost practical situations, that there is no cor-
relationbetweenAlice’s system Ap andEve’s system Ep¢ . That is, P nn,
j
i
j
ˆ (∣ )r r= ñ Äg g . Thismeans, in particular, that
D d
D d q q
, ,
, 1 , D.1
n j k
n j k l nkl nkl
, ,
, , ,
j k
j k l
( )
( ( ) ) ( )
r r
r r r
=
= + -
g g
g g g
for all n. In this scenario, the parameters Dn j k, , do not depend on the photon number n andwewill denote them
as Dj k, . Next, we calculate these quantities for the different cases.
D.1. Individual THA—Case1
In this example, the states
j
rg are of the form P e
i
j
jˆ (∣ )r b= ñg
qg .We have, therefore, that
D 1 e e 1 e . D.2j k,
i i 2 2 cos 1j k k j
2
∣ ∣ ∣ ( )[ ( ) ]b b= - á ñ = -q q b q q- -g g g g
Herewe can assume, without loss of generality, that 0
s
q =g .Moreover, wewill denote I2 max≔b . This implies,
in particular, that Dw,s and Dv, w are given by
D
D
1 e ,
1 e . D.3
I
I
w,s
2 cos 1
v, w
2 cos 1
max w
max w v ( )
[ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ]
= -
= -
q
q q
-
- -
g
g g
The parameters Dn j k l, , , have the form
D P q P q P
1
2
e e 1 e . D.4n j k l nkl nkl, , ,
i i ij k l∣ ˆ (∣ ) ˆ (∣ ) ( ) ˆ (∣ )∣ ( )b b b= ñ - ñ - - ñq q qg g g
In order to calculate these quantities we use the followingClaim,which requires to obtain the eigenvalues of a
3×3matrix.
Claim. Let i i 1,2,3{∣ } { }añ = , be three normalised but not necessarily orthogonal vectors, and let il be the
eigenvalues of a 3×3matrixA defined as
A p p1 , D.5i j i j i j i j, ,1 1 ,2 2 ,3 3( ) ∣ ∣ ( ) ∣ ( )d a a d a a d a a= á ñ - á ñ - - á ñ
with p1 0  andwhere i j,d is the Kronecker delta. Then
P pP p P
1
2
1
1
2
. D.6
i
i1 2 3∣ ˆ (∣ ) ˆ (∣ ) ( ) ˆ (∣ )∣ ∣ ∣ ( )åa a a lñ - ñ - - ñ =
Proof.To calculate the trace distance of P pP p P11 2 3≔ ˆ (∣ ) ˆ (∣ ) ( ) ˆ (∣ )r a a añ - ñ - - ñ we need to determine its
eigenvalues.Moreover, from the properties of the determinant we have that V VDet Det 1( ˆ) ( ˆ)r l r l- = -- 
for any invertible linear operationV. Then, we can constructV as follows
V i i V, and , D.7i i
1∣ ∣ ∣ ¯ ∣ ( )a añ = ñ á = á-
where i i 1,2,3{∣ } { }ñ = is an orthonormal basis, and i∣ā ñ represent unnormalised vectors satisfying i j i j,¯ ∣a a dá ñ = .
With these definitions, we can useV and i∣ā ñ to relate thematrix elements ofV V1r- defined in the orthogonal
basis i i{∣ }ñ to those of ρ defined in the nonorthogonal basis i i{∣ }a ñ . In particular, we have that
i V V j P p P
p P A1 , D.8
i j i j i j
i j i j
1
1 2
3 ,
∣ ∣ ¯ ∣ ∣ ¯ ∣ ˆ (∣ )∣ ¯ ∣ ˆ (∣ )∣
( ) ¯ ∣ ˆ (∣ )∣ ( ) ( )
r a r a a a a a a a
a a a
á ñ = á ñ = á ñ ñ - á ñ ñ
- - á ñ ñ =
-
with A i j,( ) given by equation (D.5).
D.2. Individual THA—Case2
In this example, the states
j
rg are of the form P e
i
j j
jˆ (∣ )r b= ñg g
qg , where the amplitudes
j
bg are given in
equation (31). That is, here we assume that the back-reflected light that goes to Eve is attenuated in a similar
manner as Alice’s signals. In this scenario, we have that
D 1 e e
1 e . D.9
j k,
i i 2
2 cos
j
j
k
k
j k j k k j
2 2
∣ ∣ ∣
( )
( )
b b= - á ñ
= -
g
q
g
q
b b b b q q- - + -
g g
g g g g g g
Again, if we assume, without loss of generality, that 0
s
q =g andwe use equation (31)wefind that the quantities
Dw,s and Dv, w are given by
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D
D
1 e ,
1 e . D.10
w,s
2 cos
v, w
2 cos
I
I
max
s s w s w w
max
s v w v w w v ( )
[ ( )]
[ ( )]
= -
= -
g g g g q
g g g g q q
- + -
- + - -
g g
g g g
The parameters Dn j k l, , , have the form
D P q P q P
1
2
e e 1 e . D.11n j k l nkl nkl, , ,
i i i
j
j
k
k
l
l∣ ˆ (∣ ) ˆ (∣ ) ( ) ˆ (∣ )∣ ( )b b b= ñ - ñ - - ñg q g q g qg g g
Like in the previous subsection, we calculate these quantities by using theClaim introduced above.
D.3. Individual THA—Case3
Here the states
j
rg are of the form given by equation (32)with the intensities
2
j
bg given by equation (31). This
corresponds to the scenario where Eve’s back-reflected light is phase-randomised and,moreover, it is attenuated
in a similarmanner as Alice’s signals. In this situation, we have that
D
n n
1
2
e e . D.12j k
n
n n
,
0
2 2
j
j
k
k
2 2
! !
( )å
b b
= -b
g b g
=
¥
- -g g
Thismeans, in particular, that the parameters Dw,s and Dv, w are given by
D
I
n
D
I
n
e
2
1 e ,
1
2
e 1 e . D.13
I
n
n
I
n
n
n
I
n
w,s
0
max 1 w
s
v, w
0
max v s 1 w
v
I
max
max w s
max v
s max v s w v
!
( )
!
( )
( )
( )
å
å
g
g
g g g
g
= -
= -
g g
g g g g
-
=
¥
-
-
=
¥
-gg
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
These expressions involve an infinite number of terms.However, one can easily upper bound themwith afinite
sum. For instance, it can be shown that when I log 2max  and s v w g g g (which is always satisfied in the
simulation results shown in section 4) Dw,s and Dv, w can be upper bounded as
D
I
n
D
I
n
1
2
e
2
1 1 e ,
1
2
1
2
e
1 1 e . D.14
I
n
P n
I
n
n
P n
I
n
w,s
0
max 1 w
s
v, w
0
max v s
1 w
v
I
max cut
max w s
max v
s
cut
max v s w v
!
( )
!
( )
( )
( )


å
å
g
g
g g
g
g
- - -
-
´ - -
g g
g g g g
-
=
-
-
=
-
g
g
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥
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for any P 1cut  . To see this, let us consider, for instance, the parameter Dw,s. From equation (D.13)we have that
Dw,s satisfies
D
I
n
I
n
I
n
I
n
e
2
1 e
e
2
,
1 e
e
2
1 e
e
2
. D.15
I
n
P n
I
n I
n P
n
I
n I
n
P n
I
n I
n P
n
w,s
0
max 1 w
s 1
max
1 w
s 0
max
1 w
s 1
max
max cut
max w s
max
cut
max w s
max cut
max w s
max
cut
! !
!
!
( )
( )
( )
( )

å å
å
å
g
g
g
g
g
g
= - +
´ -
´ - +
g g
g g
g g
-
=
-
-
= +
¥
-
-
=
-
-
= +
¥
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
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In the inequality conditionwe have used the fact that
1 e 1 D.16I
n
1 w
s
max w s ( )( ) g
g
- g g-
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
for all n 0 and I log 2max  given that s v w g g g . This is so because e e 0I I
n
1max max w s w
s
( )( ) g g gg- .
Finally, by substituting the term I ne 2I n P
n
1 max
max
cut
!å- = +
¥ with I n1 2 1 e I n
P n
0 max
max cut[ !]- å- = we obtain
equation (D.13). The derivation of the upper bound for Dv, w is analogous.
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The parameters Dn j k l, , , are given by
D
n
q
n
q
n
1
2
e e 1 e . D.17n j k l
n
n
nkl
n
nkl
n
, , ,
0
2 2 2
j
j
k
k
l
l
2 2 2
! !
( )
!
( )å
b b b
= - - -b
g b g b g
=
¥
- - -g g g
If we substitute the intensities 2
j
bg with the values given in equation (31)we have, therefore, that
D
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Again, these equations involve an infinite number of terms.However, as above, it can be shown thatwhen
I log 2max  and s v w g g g the parameters D D,n n,s, v, w ,v,s,w and Dn,w,s,v are upper bounded by
D
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for any P 1cut  . To see this, the procedure is analogous to the one used to derive equation (D.14). In particular,
let us consider the quantity Dn,s, v, w. From equation (D.18)wehave that Dn,s, v, w can be upper bounded as
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Herewe have used the fact that
q q1 e 1 e
1, D.21
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for all n 0 and I log 2max  given that s v w g g g . Equation (D.21) holds because
e e 0I I n1 k smax
max k s ( )( ) g gg g- for all k v, w{ }Î . Finally, by replacing in equation (D.20)
I ne 2I n P
n
1 max
max
cut
!å- = +
¥ with I n1 2 1 en
P I n
0 max
cut max[ !]- å =
- one obtains equation (D.19). The upper bounds for
Dn,v,s,w and Dn,w,s,v can be obtained in a similarmanner.
Appendix E. Toolbox for Alice andBob, and channelmodel
In this appendixwe introduce a simplemathematicalmodel to characterise Alice’s and Bob’s devices, together
with the behaviour of a typical quantum channel. Thismodel is used to simulate the observed experimental data
Q jg and E jg , with j s, v, w{ }Î , which is needed to evaluate the examples considered in section 4.Here wewill
consider that Q jg and E jg do not depend on the basis setting, i.e., they are equal for both the Z and theXbasis.
In particular, we assume the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol with phase-encoding. In each time slot,
Alice prepares twoWCP, the signal and the reference pulse, whose joint phase is perfectly randomised. Then, she
selects at random aphasemodulation 0, 2, , 3 2{ }f p p pÎ and applies it to the signal pulse. The values 0 and
π ( 2p and 3 2p ) correspond to the Z (X) basis. In addition, Alice uses an intensitymodulator to randomly
choose the intensity , ,s v w{ }g g g gÎ of both the signal and the reference pulse following the prescriptions of the
decoy-statemethod. As a result, Alice sends Bob states of the form
P
1
2
e e d , E.1i i, A
0
2
i
r
i
sp∣
ˆ (∣ ∣ ) ( )( )òp g g qY ñ = ñ ñ
f g
p
q q f+
where the subscript s (r) identifies the signal (reference) pulse and 0, 2[ )q pÎ is a randomphase.
On the receiving side, Bob uses aMZI to divide the incoming pulses into two possible paths. Then he applies
a phase shift 0, 2{ }f pÎ together with a one-pulse delay to one of them, and he recombines both pulses at a
50:50 beamsplitter. This beamsplitter has on its ends two single-photon detectors, whichwe denote asD0 and
D1.Whenever the relative phase between the two interfering pulses is 0 ( p ) only the detector D D0 1( ) can
produce a ‘click’, which indicates that at least one photon has been detected. In case that both detectors ‘click’
Bob uses the standard post-processing stepwhere he assigns a randomvalue to the raw bit [67]. Given that both
detectors have the same quantum efficiency and assuming for themoment that there is no side-channel in Bob’s
measurement unit, this data post-processing guarantees the so-called basis independent detection efficiency
condition. That is, Bob’s detection efficiency is the same for both BB84 bases. Each detector is described by a
positive operator valuemeasurewith two elements, Fnoclickˆ and Fclickˆ . The outcome of Fnoclickˆ corresponds to a
‘no click’ event, whereas the operator Fclickˆ gives one detection ‘click’. These operators are given by
F p P n
F F
1 1 ,
. E.2
n
n
noclick d
0
det
click noclick
ˆ ( ) ( ) ˆ (∣ )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
å h= - - ñ
= -
=
¥

Here pd denotes the detector’s dark count rate and deth is its detection efficiency.
The quantum channel introduces loss that can be parametrised by the transmission efficiency channelh given
by
10 , E.3channel
d
10 ( )h = a-
whereα is the loss coefficient of the channelmeasured in dB km−1 and d is the transmission distancemeasured
in km. In addition, we assume that theQKD setup has an intrinsic error rate ed due tomisalignment and
instability of the optical system.
By using themathematicalmodels above, it can be shown that the gain Q jg and the error rate E jg can be
expressed as
Q p
E
Q
p
1 1 e .
1
2
1
2
1 e e , E.4e
d
2
d
1 e
j j
j
j
j j
sys
sys d sys d
( )
( )[ ] ( )( )
= - -
= + - -
g g h
g
g
g h g h
-
- - -
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where sysh represents the overall loss of the system. It is given by
, E.5sys channel B det ( )h h h h=
with Bh being the internal loss of Bob’smeasurement device without considering his detectors. That is, we
assume that the total loss within Bob’s receiver is B deth h .
Appendix F. Approaching the optimal THAwith phase-randomised coherent states
In this appendixwe consider the scenariowhere Eve’s back-reflected light is phase-randomised (i.e., Case 3 in
section 4), andwe analyse an alternative strategy for Eve.More precisely, we assume that Eve sends Alice n-
photon Fock states instead of coherent states. This constitutes her optimal strategy in this situation, and below
we analyse howmuch could now the parameters Dj k, deviate from the ones obtained in appendixD.
Let us consider here the standardmodel of a beamsplitter with transmissivity
j
hg to characterise the loss
introduced byAlice’s device on Eve’s input signals. Then, if Eve injects an n-photon state n∣ ñ into Alice’s device,
the state of the back-reflected light is given by
n
k
k k1 , F.1
k
k n k
0
j j j
( ) ∣ ∣ ( )ås h h= - ñág g g
=
¥
-⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
The trace distance between these states and the ones given by equation (32) is
d P k B n k,
1
2
, , F.2
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g
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g
g is a Poisson distribution ofmean
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h mg , B n k
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, 1k n k
j j j
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⎠
is
a Binomial distribution, and
j
hg denotes Alice’s transmission rate.When compared to the notation used in
equation (32), note that 2
j j
≔b h mg g , withμ being the intensity of Eve’s input pulses. Importantly, from [68]we
have that whenever nm = (i.e., the intensity of Eve’s input pulses is the same in both scenarios) then
equation (F.2) can be upper bounded by
d , 2 . F.3
j j j
( ) ( )r s hg g g
Then, by using the triangle inequality we have that the trace distance between
j
sg and ksg is upper bounded
by
d B n k B n k D,
1
2
, , 2 , F.4
k
j k
0
,j k j k j k
( ) ∣ ( ) ( )∣ ( ) ( )ås s h h= - + +g g h h g g
=
¥
g g
where D d ,j k,
j k
( )r r= g g is given by equation (D.12).
In the examples considered in section 4 the parameters
j
hg are typically very small (of the order of
10 1013 18–- - for a 1 GHz-clockedQKD system) for all j s, v, w{ }Î . Thismeans, in particular, that
d D, j k,j k( )s s »g g and, therefore, the results presented in section 4 (see Case 3) are also valid for the scenario
where Eve injects n-photon Fock states intoAlice’s device.
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